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Abstract 
Current paradigms for machine-based learning and teaching tend to perform their task 
in isolation from a rich context of existing knowledge. In contrast, the research project 
presented here takes the view that bringing multiple sources of knowledge to bear is of 
central importance to learning in complex domains. As a consequence teaching must both .. 
take advantage of and beware of interactions between new and existing knowledge. The 
central process which connects learning to its context is reasoning by analogy, a primary 
concern of this research. In teaching, the connection is provided by the explicit use of a 
learning model to reason about the choice of teaching actions. In this learning paradigm, 
new concepts are incrementally refined and integrated into a body of expertise, rather 
than being evaluated against a static notion of correctness. The domain chosen for this 
experimentation is that of learning to solve "algebra story problems." A model of acquiring 
problem solving skills in this domain is described, including: representational structures for 
background knowledge, a problem solving architecture, learning mechanisms, and the role 
of analogies in applying existing problem solving abilities to novel problems. Examples of 
learning are given for representative instances of algebra story problems. After relating our 
views to the psychological literature, we outline the design of a teaching system. Finally, 
we insist on th~ interdependence of learning and teaching and on the synergistic effects of 
conducting both research efforts in parallel. 
t This report is the body of a proposal submitted to the National Science Foundation and to the Office 
of Naval Research. 
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I. Introduction 
Research in expert systems has shown that knowledge, not search, is the key to 
expertise. Cw-rently most research in learning and teaching involves a single, narrow 
arena of expertise. However, neither learning nor teaching takes place in a vacuum. 
We plan to develop computational models of how learning and teaching interact with 
existing knowledge. To this end, we plan to construct both a learning system and a 
teaching system which take multiple knowledge sources into account. By incorporating 
both teaching and learning components in a single experimental system, we can test a 
variety of hypotheses concerning underlying representations and processes which support 
adaptive problem solving behavior. These experiments would be impossible without both 
components. 
Our primary interest is the acquisition of problem solving expertise .. As we discuss in 
more detail later, we have chosen to focus on the specific task domain of solving "algebra 
story problems." Given their unique educational status, these kinds of problems are 
particularily appropriate for computational investigation of learning and teaching. On 
the one hand, these problems are salient within a traditional academic curriculum. in that 
they purport to connect quantitative problem solving skills (e.g., solving for unknowns with 
simultaneous linear equations) with "real-world" situations which students can be expected 
to face in adult life (e.g.,. choosing among different investments or scheduling activities ... 
in a work environment). On the other hand, there appears to be consistent anecdotal 
evidence that such problem solving skills, embodied in instruction on "applied problems" 
consisting of sets of algebra story problems and techniques for their solution (Kolman and 
Schapiro, 1981), are poorly taught if taught at all in a classroom setting. Our experiences 
in mathematical instruction as well as in discussions with secondary school educators 
confirm Simon's (1980) lament that "textbooks are much more explicit in enunciating the 
laws of mathematics or of nature than in saying anything about when these laws may 
be useful in solving problems (p. 92)." Hence, although teaching the problem· solving 
skills necessary in solving algebra story problems is an important goal in most educational 
curricula, effectively teaching such skills appears to be done haphazardly. If one's purpose 
is to understand such problem solving skills so that they might be more effectively taught, 
it is necessary to develop a relatively specific, empirically verifiable model of learning in 
this domain. Hence, our research has a practical as well as a theoretical orientation. 
We intend to show that problem solving begins with problem understanding. We 
view problem understanding as the correct application of previous knowledge to achieve a 
unified representation of some problem. As we will discuss, the use of previous knowledge 
in new situations is directed by a process of analogical reasoning. In the context of multiple 
knowledge sources, learning is primarily a process of modifying (extending, reorganizing, 
correcting) background knowledge sources for the purpose of problem solving. Unlike 
typical machine learning research, we view learning not merely as discrimination or gen-
eralization, but rather as concept evolution. In this view, teaching strives to provide 
support to this evolution by diagnosing the causes of errors and by providing appropriate 
instruction in terms of the multiple knowledge sources involved. 
In the second section we introduce the domain of solving algebra story problems and 
explain why we have chosen this domain to test our ideas. We also discuss the representa-
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tion of problems and background knowledge representation, and we propose a candidate 
problem solver, analogical processes, and learning mechanisms. To further motivate the 
proposed computational model of learning, we give some examples of its intended behavior. 
We conclude this section with a discussion of the psychological plausibility of the proposed 
computational model. 
In the third section, we discuss the teaching module. Here we describe the represen-
tation of the student knowledge, the formation of a student model, expected errors in 
student behavior, and corrective actions that the teacher can take. We also consider the 
relevant literature in Intelligent Teaching Systems (ITS). Finally we discuss the value of 
interactions between the learning and teaching systems. 
II. Learning with Multiple Knowledge Sources 
The particular problem domain chosen for this experimental paradigm is that of learn-
ing to solve "word" or "story" problems typical of algebra instruction ·at the elementary 
and high school level. For example, consider the following "triangle" problem, taken from 
Mayer (1981): 
Jerry walks 1 block east along a vacant lot and then e bloclca north to a friend's 
. house. Phil starts at the same point and wallca diagonally through the vacant lot 
coming out at the same point as Jerry. If Jerry walked 117 feet east and 400 feet 
north, how far did Phil walk? 
This is called a "triangle" problem since its solution rests on relating the problem to 
. some basic facts about triangles. Other types of word problems that high school students 
learn to solve, as reported by Hinsley, Hayes and Simon (1977), focus on distant-rate-time, 
average, ratio; conversion, area, max-min, mixture, simple probability, simple. physics, 
progressions, navigation, number, work, and exponentials. A later study by Mayer (1981) 
refined this clustering of problem types into approximately 50 distinct problem templates 
organized as a simple classification hierarchy. Although the intent of these studies was 
largely to document classification schema which students reliably use to interpret and then 
solve algebra word problems, the identification and description of these problem schema 
provides a rare opportunity for choosing a task domain for which there exists a substantial 
body of descriptive and experimental literature based on human performance. 
There are a numb~r of re~ons for choosing the domain of algebra story problems: 
• the domain is reactive in that the learning component can check the validity of the 
equations it generates by solving the equations and checking the answers. 
• solving word problems involves multiple sources of knowledge including both specific 
problem templates and supporting background knowledge (i.e., knowledge of geo-
graphic orientation would be essential in recognizing a right triangle). 
• the particular background or common sense knowledge sources required are numerous 
(we estimate 20 to 50 sources) but constrained, given the finite set of objects and 
relationships included in the story problems. 
• the domain provides a rich experimental medium intermediate between mathematical 
and common-sense knowledge reasoning tasks. 
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• examples of human performance in this domain have been and continue to be the 
subject of empirical investigation in educational and cognitive psychology, allowing 
comparison between computational and behavioral approaches to teaching and learning 
problem solving abilities. 
Problem Representation 
We will assume that the story problem is presented to the learning system as a relatively 
fiat set of propositions without an explicit representation of structural relations among 
propositions. For the triangle story mentioned above this representation might be: 
motion-event{e1} object{e1,Jerry) distance{d,1 bloek} dirution{e1,east) 
motion-event{el} object(ee,Jerry) distance(ee,e bloek} dirution(ee,north} 
motion-event( e9) object( e9,Phil) beginning( e9, end{ el)) end{ e9, beginning( el)) 
distance{d,117 /eet) distance{el,-400 feet). 
with the goal of finding distance{e9,Answer). This representation is relatively complete 
with respect to the literal problem statement and includes information which is extraneous 
to the desired solution (e.g., that Jerry walks three blocks) but also excludes information 
which must be ·inferred if a solution will be found (e.g., that a right triangle has been 
described). Representations of similar problems described in the psychological literature 
include inferences from the data and abstractions of important details without describing .. 
how such processes take place. In the context of this proposal, such an augmented 
propositional description represents an intermediate level between our input propositions 
and more structured forms of representation from which equations utilized in the problem 
solution can be derived. A test of the intermediate nature of these inferred descriptions can 
be made by considering slight changes to the problem query. For representations reported 
in the literature, minor changes in the stated problem require substantial changes to the 
problem representation. 
As will be discussed more fully in describing our candidate problem solving architec-
ture, generation of a problem description which adds appropriate structural inferences 
and suppresses irrelevant problem details is a central aspect of effective problem solving. 
This is precisely the sense in which we asserted previously that problem understanding 
constitutes the beginning phase of skilled problem solving activity by "connecting" a 
newly encountered problem with existing background knowledge. It is within this context 
of generating an incr~asingly _coherent problem representation that multiple background 
knowledge sources play a crucial role. 
Background Knowledge Representation 
In this section we describe how multiple knowledge sources can provide raw material 
for use in problem solving and learning as well as in the teaching process. Recent efforts 
point to the importance of the integration of multiple viewpoints in knowledge repre-
sentation both in the learning and the ICAI literatures. Burstein (1983) uses multiple 
analogies to learn concepts in BASIC program.ming, calling on different analogical sources 
for different aspects of a developing concept. Rumelhart and Norman (1981) argue that 
multiple analogical models are necessary to develop and impart a proper understanding 
of a word processor and its use. They emphasize the need for the teacher to explicitly 
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guide the formation of these models, observing that students will often spontaneously 
construct their own analogical models and that these models are often deeply erroneous. 
Brown and Burton (1975) attribute much of SOPHIE's success to its interacting multiple 
knowledge representations. Finally, and perhaps most definitively, Stevens and Collins 
(1982), after years of experimentation with their SCHOLAR and later WHY tutors, state 
as a conclusion that "the step from a unitary to a multi-dimensional representation for 
instructional know ledge is a necessary one". 
While we are strongly committed to the necessity of multiple background knowledge 
sources interacting in the framing of a problem for solution, we have no particularily strong 
committment to specific representational techniques for varied knowledge sources. In the 
following paragraphs we describe what types of knowledge sources we plan to include based 
on an analysis of sample problems found in Mayer (1981), and then briefly consider how 
these multiple knowledge sources might be represented. As will be discussed more fully in 
the context of the candidate problem solving architecture, specific representational details 
across varied knowledge sources will be "hidden" by treating each source as a relatively 
opaque computational object accessible through a uniform propositional interface language. 
1. Methods. Solution methods will be stored as "schemata", a term used by Mayer, 
Larkin and Kadane (1984) to denote the generic methods related to problem types in 
their taxonomy. In our view, the schema includes a cue which is expressed in terms of .. 
the features and relations of the problem description (e.g. a motion event where the 
rate is to be computed) and a solution method which suggests applicable equations. 
2. Events. Events are central to the description of algebra story problems. Most 
problems require extraction of quantitative constraints from a single event or multiple 
interacting events. For the representation of primitive events, we will use frames: each 
generic event is represented as a set of slots for its different features, and a particular 
event is a (possibly partial) instantiation of these -slots with values. Frames have a 
long history as primitive knowledge structures in A.I. They were heralded as a general 
knowledge representation scheme by Minsky (1975) and have since become ubiquitous 
as organizational structures in a variety of knowledge representation approaches (e.g., 
Schank's (1975) conceptual primitives). Examples of primitive events relevant to 
knowledge of algebra story problems would be motion or work events. 
3. Objects. Physical objects will be organized in a semantic net of frames. This semantic 
net will be simple- since there is relatively little inference needed at the object level in 
algebra story problems. This is in contrast to the sensitive treatment- of inheritance 
relations advocated by Brachman, Fikes and Levesque (1983). Some object level infer-
ences will be necessary for evaluation of candidate solutions (e.g. a car cannot travel 
at 200 mph), and the network will provide a conceptual hierarchy for generalization of 
slot values necessary for concept evolution and elaboration of analogies. 
4. Space. The representation of spatial knowledge remains an open question in AI. 
Fortunately, the kind of spatial knowledge required for the understanding and the 
solution of algebra story problems appears to be relatively simple compared to more 
general problems of spatial reasoning. Analysis of sample problems presented by Mayer 
(1981) suggests that we may not need to employ recursively defined hierarchical data 
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I 
I. 
structures such as quadtrees {Samet, 1984) typical in computational approaches to 
vision. Indeed a rather simple line diagram is sufficient to allow the necessary spatial 
inferences in sample problems we have studied thus far. Therefore, the representation 
we have adopted is of the "homomorphic" variety (Hayes, 1974): in a cartesian coor-
dinate system, the relative positions of points and lengths of segments constitute an 
isomorphic model of the physical relations. Similar diagrams have been used as early 
as the sixties in proving geometric theorems (Gelemter, 1963) and more recently in 
Novak's ISAAC physics problem solver (Novak, 1976). 
5. Time. Representation of temporal relations demonstrates another problem which, 
when taken in its full generality, remains an open problem in AI. Fortunately; temporal 
inferences for algebra story problems appear relatively straightforward, underscoring 
the desirability of this task domain as midpoint between heavily constrained, formal 
reasoning tasks and the more general difficulties of common-sense reasoning. For 
our purposes, we should be able to use a version of the interval-based temporal logic 
proposed by Allen (1983). This logic allows reasoning over relations between intervals 
which can easily generate the predicates on endpoints that we need. 
6. Facts. There will be a collection of facts that can be represented propositionally, which 
we will assume the learner already knows or will be given by the teacher. These facts 
include specific knowledge of geometry (such knowledge is not equivalent to but may ... 
rely upon spatial knowledge), numerical concepts, and monetary knowledge. 
7. Abstract relations. Finding quantitative constraints within the representation of 
the problem is the final goal of our problem solving architecture. In their solvable 
form, these constraints must be expressed as equations. The concept of equality is 
therefore central to the process of solving algebra story problems. Matz (1982) studies 
the evolution of the concept of equality between arithmetic and algebra, but she does 
not propose a representation of the concept. In fact, there is very little in the literature 
regarding a declarative representation of such abstract concepts. In response we plan 
to adopt a rule-based representation which should satisfy the needs of our problem 
solver. Some examples of the we are considering follow: 
a. Two units of measure are compatible iff they are the same or there exists a 
conversion algorithm between them (i.e., they belong to the same class); 
b. Two things can be compared iff they are expressed in compatible units of measure; 
c. Two quantities can be-equated iff they can be compared and their numerical values 
are the same; 
d. A quantity can be said to be larger than another smaller one iff they can be 
compared and the larger one can be additively decomposed into one subpart which 
is equal to the smaller one and another non-null subpart. 
8. Remaining issues. There are two remaining issues which may prove to be important 
aspects of background knowledge, but which we are currently deferring. First is the 
potential necessity of representing and reasoning about the intentions of actors involved 
in algebra story problems. We are confident that goals (and therefore plans to achieve 
them) that underly the events of the story problem are important for the characters 
involved in the story, but do not actively participate in the quantitative derivations of 
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the solution process. The second issue concerns objects as resources. Time as a relation 
between events may not be the same as time as a resource which can be consumed. 
This is especially true in cases where there is competition for resources. Space and 
money are other examples. Unfortunately, little work has been done on the question 
of resources in problem solving. An important consideration is the decomposability of 
resource consuming actions. For instance, the time needed by one person to complete 
action A and action B is an additive combination of the individual times, but this is not 
the case if different people perform each action. Morris (1984) describes a formalism 
which expresses the preconditions of operators in terms of multisets of consumable 
resources. We are considering using his formalism should the need arise for explicit 
representation of consumable resources. 
A Candidate Problem Solver 
In this section we will outline an architecture for the problem solver, the prerequisite 
representations, and their relationships. To clarify some of the processes and structures 
we will give snapshots of the intended system's performance. 
We regard problem solving in the context of algebra story problems as a particular 
example of cooperating multiple knowledge sources. Fortunately, relatively well-accepted 
architectural arrangements already exist for asynchronous management of independent .. 
but cooperating knowledge sources via a globally accessible database or context (Erman 
et al., 1980). For our purposes, background knowledge sources (described in terms of their 
content in the preceding section) function as relatively autonomous and, by virtue of the 
opacity of their particular representational medium, anonymous agents which influence 
each other as well as the course of problem solving by effecting a global database. Within 
the context of algebra story problems, this database is the current status of a problem 
description and serves as an interface for interaction among multiple knowledge sources. 
Initially, the problem representation is a jumbled set of propositions with very little 
structure. At· each step the problem solver modifies the problem representation, forming 
a new state description. Each individual knowledge source adds what information it can. 
This process continues until the goal is reached. The goal is a description which contains 
a set of equations which correctly solves the initial problem. Thus, the process of problem 
solving we are proposing is one of constructing an increasingly coherent description of a 
current problem, using applicable knowledge sources, until sufficient constraints have been 
collected to derive a plausible solution. 
Although the problem solver may utilize a large number of knowledge sources, there 
appear to be five basic types. While in the previous section we described background 
knowledge sources primarily in terms of their content, the current description considers 
knowledge sources in terms of their role in problem solving. This functional view suggests 
the categories of augmentors, organizers, transformers, assertors, and decomposers. The 
first three types all change the problem representation by adding propositions. The later 
two types add equations to the problem representation. Since the goal of the problem 
solver is to form an appropriate set of equations, and this can only be accomplished by 
applying the latter two types of agents or knowledge experts, the goal of the first three 
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types is to modify the representation so that the latter types may apply. We now briefly 
describe each of the five types of knowledge sources. 
An augmentor adds information to the problem description by bringing in background 
knowledge. For example, the information that John flew from New York to Chicago, then 
on to Los Angeles and finally back to New York implies that John traversed a triangular 
path. That three straight lines connecting head to toe form a triangle is part of background 
knowledge. As discussed earlier, the various knowledge sources will have representations 
tuned to their particular form, but the net result of these background know ledge sources is 
to provide additional propositions important for the problem at hand. Thus augmentation 
adds pieces of information to the problem description which eventually participate in 
constraint relations allowing generation of a plausible solution. 
An organizer adds information to the problem description by adding structure to the 
problem. Organizers take pieces of information and put them into a single unit. For 
example, the fact that John leaves New York and goes to Chicago means that a motion-
event has occurred. Since additional information is available about motion-events, a richer 
and more structured problem description is achieved. Hence, in keeping with our original 
notion that problem solving efficacy depends in large measure on problem understanding, 
organizers play a major contributing role in such an understanding by making explicit 
important constraining relations among constituents of the problem description. The .. 
system learns organizers by gradually refining seed concepts provided by the background 
knowledge. 
Transformers take a problem representation and associate with it another problem 
· representation. The process of transforming a problem is a complicated and costly one 
which, in effect, hides the complexity arising from subprocesses necessary in forming 
analogies. The subprocesses in analogy- formation (recognition, elaboration, evaluation) 
are treated in more detail in the next section. Transformers relate the current problem to 
previously solved problems. 
Thus far we have considered processing agents whose goal is to alter the problem 
description so that known methods might be recognized and applied. The next two types 
of processes involve knowledge sources which generate equations. Hence assertion and 
decomposition processes correspond most closely to what Mayer et al. (1984) intend when 
discussing problem schemata. 
Assertors associate equations with key features of a problem. For example, an assertor 
would suggest the equation d = r x t given the cues of a motion-event, known rate and 
time, and unknown distance. Assertors bring in background equational knowledge that 
involve a single frame, in this case the motion-event frame. 
Decomposers map a problem into subproblems and then relate, via equations, the re-
lationship between the problem and its subproblems. Decomposers are similar to assertors 
in that they generate equations, but in this case the equations involve more than a single 
frame. For example in the complex motion problem mentioned when describing augmen-
tation processes earlier, the total westerly distance that John travels can be decomposed 
as the sum of the distance from New York to Chicago and the distance from Chicago to 
Los Angeles. 
- 7 -
Having described each of five component processes in isolation, it is necessary to give 
some notion of how these processes will interact through a global problem description to 
give some movement towards a plausible solution to an algebra story problem at hand. The 
problem solver schedules activities of the various agents by a competitive process which 
attempts to do the least work while still progressing towards a goal state. Augmentation 
and organization are fairly simple and cheap, but do not generate any equations, and 
therefore may not be useful. Transformation is the most complicated and expensive process 
agent, but is the activity that most directly relies on and relates to previous problem solving · 
experience. Assertors and decomposers are the only operators that generate equations so 
must be applied to achieve the goal. 
As described, our candidate problem solving architecture is quite general, allowing 
investigation of a variety of problem solving behaviors with relatively minor alterations 
of control strategies (i.e., scheduling policies for competing process agents). In a less 
direct fashion, gradual evolution of conceptual material composing knowledge sources 
contributing to organization, assertion and decomposition activities should allow a range 
of problem solving performance from novice to "expert" levels for algebra story problems. 
Analogical Transformations in Problem Solving 
As we have· been discussing our proposed process model for learning problem solving .. 
skills in the task domain of solving algebra story problems, we have assumed five basic 
processes (augmentation, organization, transformation, assertion and decomposition) or-
ganized as cooperating process agents within a loose control structure mediated through 
a global database or blackboard. Augmentation, organization and transformation change 
the problem description so that assertion and/or decomposition processes are enabled, 
with a subsequent addition of constraints either in the form of equations or subproblems 
related in a particular fashion (e.g., total distance as the sum of component distances). 
As suggested previously, assertion and decomposition processes play the role of "problem 
schemata" as described in recent psychological studies of problem solving skill with algebra 
story problems (Mayer et al., 1984). 
While this process architecture gives a reasonable beginning for how problem solving 
might occur with these kinds of problems, the role of transformation processes must be 
more fully described. The intent of this section is to examine the role of transformation 
processes in representing the problem in a manner which will lead to a solution. As we have 
described the transformation process, the central goal is to alter the representation of the 
current (or target) problem so that it is partially equivalent to a previously experienced (or 
source) problem for which a solution method (either equations or a suitable decomposition) 
is known. Stated in the abstract terminology of a search of problem descriptions, the 
transformation process attempts to change the current problem description so that an 
existing problem schema (assertion or decomposition process) will be enabled and applied. 
Thus at an abstract level of description, transformation processes function in a similar 
fashion to processes of augmentation and organization. However, when viewed more 
specifically, transformation constitutes a form of analogical reasoning by its explicit goal 
of viewing a new problem as if it were equivalent to a previously experienced problem. IT 
problem schema are taken to be generalized problem descriptions (e.g.,· modelled as the 
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left-hand-side of a production) which propose particular methods (either adding equations 
or related subgoals as the right-hand-side), then an instance of transformation would be 
the alteration of a target problem description so that is partially matches a schema's 
generalized problem description. As a result, the methods associated with the matched 
schema could be applied, possibly leading to a solution directly or decomposing the problem 
in a fashion which contributes to an eventual solution. 
As described, the transformation process is one of viewing an unsolved problem as if 
it were a problem for which a solution strategy were already known. "Viewing as" in this 
context involves extending information from the solved problem into the description of the 
new problem, subject to some form of critical evaluation within the confines of the new 
problem. This is a process of analogical reasoning. By comparison with many traditional 
views of analogy in the computational literature, this may seem a weak conception of 
analogical reasoning. However, as suggested by others (e.g., Gentner, 1983), we prefer 
to think of analogy as one point midway in a continuum between literal similarity and 
nonsensical (or anomalous) comparison. Given this assumption, reasoning and learning 
processes engaged while viewing one problem as if it were another more familiar problem 
are comparable in kind to processes engaged when a new problem is recognized as an 
instance of a known problem class. Reasoning by analogy, then, may require more effort 
on the part of the reasoner with regard to confirming extended information, but is not a 
form of reasoning which can be profitably separated from more mundane forms of problem .. 
solving activity (i.e., applying a known problem schema). What remains is an explication 
of how such analogies are recognized, elaborated and confirmed (Hall, 1984) and how the 
transformation process functions in learning how to solve algebra story problems. 
Recognition of opportunities for transformation 
Recognition of a potential analogy . within our process model amounts to tentative 
acceptance of a particular problem schema on the basis of a partial match between the 
target problem description and the enabling problem description (or source description) 
contained within the problem schema. In isolation from other processes, it is easy to 
imagine some form of search among existing problem schemata to find a candidate set 
of schemata which bear a promising resemblance to the target problem. Adopting this 
view for a moment, the crucial issue in recognition of an analogy is how this search might 
be constrained.. The psychological literature is relatively mute on this point (with the 
exception of Holyoak's 1984 discussion of the importance of forming generalized problem 
schemata), while the computa.tional literature abounds with proposals for constraining such 
a search. Most promising in these latter contributors is the notion of indexing potential 
analogs on the basis of abstract relational information (e.g., Carbonell, 1981 and Kolodner, 
1983, 1984) so that recognition and retrieval will be based on higher level (and presumably 
more important) aspects of similarity. Recognition based on similarity between target 
and source problems for goals, plans or causal structure corresponds closely to Gentner's 
(1982, 1983) notion of "systematicity" in which effective analogies (for predictive purposes, 
precisely what we want in solving algebra story problems) reveal similarity in constraining 
conceptual structure rather than descriptive aspects. In the domain of algebra story 
problems, a systematic correspondence might be exemplified by a match between a simple 
motion and a simple work problem which involves some sort of event (e.g., a motion or 
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work event), a rate and a single unknown. While these matching aspects do not directly 
correspond to goals, plans or causal structure as advocated by Carbonell (1981), they 
are at a higher level than many other aspects of the participating problem descriptions 
(e.g., actor's name, starting time, etc.). Such higher level descriptive aspects might be 
distinguished from their peers by virtue of participating in the method associated with 
their problem description in the stored problem schema. 
Given a form of organization for multiple problem schemata within this task domain 
which allows indexing on particularily salient aspects of a target (unsolved) problem 
description, we would like to be able to retrieve some subset of the entire collection 
of schemata which will contain an effectively analogous problem schema if one exists. 
Deferring. for a moment the question of when search of this memory should be conducted, 
we still must place the subprocess of recognition within the surrounding model of problem 
solving. In fact, the process of recognizing a suitably applicable problem schema must be 
assumed as the central activity in our problem solving model, an activity to which processes 
of augmentation, organization and transformation are explicitly directed. Hence, we would 
like to make no special distinction between recognition processes for target problems which 
directly match an existing (source) problem schema and target problems which partially 
match an existing schema but require additional effort at elaborating and evaluating (or 
confirming) the partial match so that problem solving methods contained in the schema .. 
might be confidently applied. Thus the difference between "literal" problem understanding 
and understanding a problem by analogy is a difference in effort rather than a difference 
in kind. 
In summary, we have suggested similar processing mechanisms for routine problem 
solving and problem solving supported by an analogy. It follows reasonably that search for 
an analogy is undertaken at precisely the same time that search is initiated for an applicable 
problem schema. In fact we are arguing that an analogically related schema or a directly 
applicable schema are retrieved in exactly the same fashion, the latter being distinguished 
as an "analogy" on the basis of evidencing a less complete partial matching between the 
target problem description and the schema's problem description (or cue). The recogni-
tion process necessary for retrieving directly applicable problem schemata should prove 
sufficient for retrieval of analogically related problem schemata, providing that relatively 
weak matches between problem descriptions and schemata cues are allowed. Processes 
which contribute to the added effort described for confirming extended information from 
an analogically related problem schema are described next. 
Elaboration and evaluation of prospective analogs 
Having argued that recognition of analogies is identical to recognition of directly 
applicable problem schemata except with regard to the effort expended in confirming the 
match between problem descriptions, we are now in a position of accounting for that effort. 
Such confirmation is attained by incrementally elaborating the correspondence mapping 
between source and target problem descriptions. As aspects of the source description 
(e.g., organizing structural information) are extended to the target description through 
elaboration, the validity of these extensions must be evaluated within the target problem 
domain. In the same sense that augmentation and organization processes were described 
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as bringing supporting knowledge sources to bear in understanding a new problem, so 
too can these processes serve in confirming tentative information extended from source to 
target problem descriptions. 
However, while augmentation and organization have been previously described as filling 
in missing or disorganized aspects of a target problem description, confirmation requires 
that tentatively extended information be posited as a query to appropriate knowledge 
sources. For example, when confirming an analogy between a "work together" problem 
(the target) and an "opposite direction" motion problem (the source), knowledge of equal 
duration within the motion problem might be extended to the work problem by virtue 
of being integrally involved in the solution strategy of decomposition. The tentatively 
held assertion of equal duration in the work problem (extended from the motion problem) 
must be confirmed on the basis of knowledge which can be generated with augmentation 
processes. Similar sorts of confirmation could be achieved with organizing processes. 
Learning to Solve Algebra Story Problems 
A number of different learning mechanisms are supported by the architecture described 
in preceding sections. Broadly speaking, the system's conceptual knowledge gradually 
changes as the result of problem solving experience and instruction. Usually some direct 
instruction will be involved in the extension or correction of many aspects of background -
knowledge, while learning when to apply background knowledge is the system's responsi-
bility. Hence our computational model of learning to solve algebra story problems involves 
a variety of forms of learning including learning by being told, learning by taking advice 
and learning from examples. 
The learning mechanisms we propose satisfy a number of constraints. First, they 
are all incremental. Thus, problem solving expertise is acquired gradually through active 
experience with a succession of problems and instruction presented by the teacher. Second, 
and perhaps most importantly, learning is tolerant of errors. Put more strongly, the system 
can never know that is has a correct conceptualization and consequently the very notion of 
a correct generalization or concept is misleading in thinking about the proposed system's 
behavior. Concepts constantly change and evolve according to their problem solving utility. 
Third, newly gained knowledge is connected to old knowledge. Thus we allow no learning of 
isolated or disconnected information, a common feature of existing computational learners 
which we find implausible. 
Now we briefly consider four examples of the learning process. These examples show 
interaction of instruction, background knowledge, and experience. The first two examples 
are derived from Mayer's (1981) taxonomy. The third and fourth are hypothetical problems 
designed to mislead an inattentive reader. The first example shows how the system's refines 
naive concepts into ones more appropriate for problem solving. The second example shows 
how analogy can suggest transformation of previously learned concepts and schema into 
new problem solving knowledge. The third example shows how an inappropriate view of the 
problem, as the result of an insufficiently developed conceptual base, results in an incorrect 
solution. The last example shows how a combination of problem misrepresentation and an 
incorrect problem schema leads to missolving the problem. 
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Before discussing these examples we need to describe the existing state of knowledge 
of the system. For the first example we suppose that the system has no knowledge of any 
equations and that the system's naive concept of a motion-event consists of the following 
frame: 
Motion-event: 
agent: 
vehicle: 
to: 
from: 
Now the· system is presented with the following problem. 
Example 1: Bill Less drove from Boston to Cleveland, a distance of 624 miles, in the time 
of 12 hours. What was his driving speed. 
At this point the system is unable to solve any problems, requiring that the teacher 
instruct the system to use the equation distance = rate * time. At this point, a number 
of changes take place in the system's knowledge. First, the concept of a motion-event 
changes to include additional slots for distance, time and rate, since these were used in the 
problem solution. Moreover, the slots that were used in the solution process are marked 
as essential. The other slots are noted as potentially inappropriate as they did not 
play a role· in the solution. Second, the system forms a problem schema which associates 
with the cues, motion-event and goal to 'find rate', the method of using the equation .. 
distance= rate* time. 
After this teaching episode the system's concept of a motion-event would look like: 
Motion-event: 
agent: (unused 1) 
vehicle: (unused 1) 
to: (unused 1) 
from: (unused 1) 
distance: (essential) 
rate: (essential) 
time: (essential) 
Note that the system has demoted the to and from slots, even though these are important. 
In fact, even if the system deleted these slots from its representation, the system could still 
recover by adding them again on the basis of additional experience. As one might easily 
imagine, with additional examples the system's motion-event concept might evolve to look 
like the following where all slQts are marked "essential": 
Motion-event: 
distance: 
rate: 
duration: 
start-position: 
end-position: 
direction: 
start-time: 
end-time: 
The process of adding slots when used and deleting slots that are not used allows the 
system to avoid distinguishing between correct and errorful concepts. The system drives 
towards concepts that are useful. The Platonic notion of correct or incorrect concepts is 
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not meaningful to the system. Also slots are not added or deleted merely on the basis of 
occurrence in the problem description. The inclusion and survival of slots/features depends 
on their participation in the problem solving process. 
Now let us consider a second example which utilizes underlying processes of analogical 
reasoning to guide learning. We suppose, at this point, that the system knows how to solve 
simple distance-rate-time problems and it is presented with the following: 
Example 2: A fisherman can catch a fish every 20 minutes. If he spends an 8-hour day 
fishing, how many fish will he bring home? 
We also suppose that the system contains a naive notion of a work-event which might 
be represented as: 
work-event: 
agent: 
job: 
pay: 
instrument: 
The system recognizes that the problem involves a work event, but there is almost 
no similarity between work-events and motion-events so the system is unable to solve 
the problem. Now we allow the teacher to suggest that this problem is analogous to 
the simple distance-rate-time problem. In effect, the teacher has accomplished one of .. 
the subtasks of analogy formation, that of recognizing a potential analog. The system 
now elaborates that analog. In order to do so it must introduce additional features into 
the notion of work-event, namely a work-rate and a work-time. So again the conceptual 
language needs to change. Now work-rate and work-time, which are given as one fish 
per 20 minutes and 8 hours in this problem, can be associated with the speed and time 
of a distance-rate-time problem. To elaborate the analogy more fully requires that the 
equation work = workrate * worktime be valid. Once this equation has been confirmed, 
the problem can be correctly solved. Now a new problem schema can be formed which 
associates unknown(work) and work-event with the equation work= workrate*worktime. 
Note that the system had not been told this equation but generated it as the result 
of an analogy. As presented, recognition of the analogy between simple motion and work 
problems is provided by the teacher. However, if the system were allowed to attempt all 
possible analogies, no teacher intervention would be required for this problem. We suspect 
that such exhaustive_search of weak partial matches over existing problem schemata is 
both cognitively and computationally unreasonable. 
The next example shows how incomplete knowledge can lead to an incorrect solution. 
At this point we refrain from explicitly listing the relevant knowledge structures as they 
should be clear form the preceding examples. 
Example 3. John hikes for four hours at 9 miles per hour. For the first half of his trip he 
travels north, then he travels east. At the end, how far away from his initial starting point 
is he? 
ff the system or a student represents the problem as a single motion-event with the goal of 
finding the unknown distance, then the problem schema developed in the first example will 
lead to the conclusion that the distance is 12 miles. To correct this, let us suppose that the 
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teacher gives generic advice to read the problem carefully, which is really an instruction 
to form a better understanding of the problem. In our terms a better understanding 
is achieved by organizing more of the information within the problem description. In 
particular, and this may require further instruction, the direction of motion has not been 
represented. Once the concept of a motion-event is elaborated to include a direction, 
then the problem can be understood as containing two motion-events. Now the previous 
problem schema involving a single motion-event would no longer apply. Unless the learner 
had knowledge of right triangles and of angular relationships among geographic directions, 
the problem would still be unsolvable, but use of the errorful solution· method would no 
longer occur. 
Focusing attention on particularly salient aspects of a problem statement, suggested 
by the teacher in the previous example, raises important issues regarding differences in 
problem solving between naive and expert reasoners. It seems likely that substantial 
differences exist in terms of conceptual structures (Larkin, 1983) and interpretive processes 
(Clement, 1982) involved in problem understanding which give rise to qualitatively different 
problem solving behaviors. For our purposes, these differences can be understood in terms 
of gradually evolving conceptual structures (e.g., introducing a slot for direction into a 
motion-event frame) which organize problem information with increasing effectiveness 
and an increasingly important role for analogy as a means of viewing unfamiliar problem 
situations as variations of familiar problem types. .. 
As an additional strategy for learning when to apply particular solution methods, we 
can envision the learner's generation of specific variations of problem descriptions in a 
effort to find key problem features for a particular solution method. This is akin to the 
notion of problem perturbation (Kibler and Porter, 1983b), involving a form of simulation 
in which values of selected slots of a problem are varied with subsequent problem solving 
efforts to determine which slot values are criteria! to use of a method in question. In 
the previous example, one might imagine problem variations aimed at determining which 
problem features appropriately enable attempted application of the Pythagorean theorem 
(e.g., features which describe a right angle in a triange problem). At present, we imagine 
that this sort of activity would only be undertaken by relatively advanced problem solvers. 
The next example shows an overly general problem schema combining with sparse 
conceptual knowledge to result in an incorrect solution to a hypothetical problem. 
Example 4. John fti~s for -I -hours at 100 mph. It costs him $40 per hour to fly. How 
much did the flight cost'I 
Assuming the system had an appropriate concept of a motion-event, but had formed an 
incorrect schema associating a motion-event problem plus an unknown with the use of 
the distance-rate-time formula, then the system might incorrectly respond with 400. This 
might happen to a student who did not bother to carefully read the problem and form a 
representation of all the information within the problem. Certainly one can easily imagine 
a slight variant of this problem where an answer like 400 was appropriate. 
As in the last example, we may imagine that the advice is to reread the problem, i.e. 
form a more complete problem representation. In particular this problem requires finding 
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an amount of money not a distance. Instructors often try to encourage such a deeper 
representation by asking students to include units or dimension within the answer. 
By modifying the problem schema for distance-rate-time to include units, the learner 
would not incorrectly apply this schema when the unknown required expression as a mon-
etary amount. By forcing a more complete problem representation, such that the learner 
records a motion-event, a transaction-event (an exchange of objects) and an unknown cost, 
schema misapplication can be avoided. 
These few examples have shown the nature of conceptual evolution. In particular they 
illustrate how concepts and problem schema can be learned and unlearned. Naive concepts 
lead to weak problem representation and understanding, which leads to weak problem solv-
ing ability. Larkin (1983) and Clement (1982) note that an important difference between 
naive and expert problem solvers is that the latter spend more time (proportionally) on 
problem representation, building more elaborate and integrated representations. This is 
modelled in our system by the actions of organization processes in concert with frame-like 
representational structures for primitive concepts. The evolution of such concepts is a 
necessary step in the development of problem solving skill. 
Cognitive Consistency 
A sizable body of empirical work has accumulated over the past two decades with ... 
respect to problem solving skills involved in solving algebra word and story problems. We 
intend to shape our computational model of learning and teaching problem solving skills 
in this task domain so that it is consistent with appropriate aspects of this literature, 
and, where necessary, to supplement this body of empirical evidence with elaborations 
of existing datasets (e.g., raw "thinking-aloud" protocols for problem solving episodes 
reported in the literature) or collection of our own evidence regarding the specific form of 
such problem solving skills and the manner in which they are acquired. In this section, 
we will discuss existing psychological studies which provide partial answers to important 
questions regarding problem solving skill within this task domain, and suggest what sorts 
of further experimentation may be necessary in testing the psychological plausibility of the 
process model for learning and teaching problem solving skills which we are proposing. 
Review of the existing psychological literature 
Corresponding to each of the five general process components described in earlier 
sections of this propmsal, relevant psychological research on problem solving skills will be 
discussed. As will become clear, much of this work is suggestive but hardly conclusive with 
respect to knowledge structures or processes involved in problem solving generally, and in 
solving algebra story problems specifically. Furthermore, the psychological literature is 
sparse regarding how a problem solver might acquire such problem solving skills. 
In terms of augmenting and organizing a problem representation so that it be-
comes increasingly suitable for solution, we have argued that inferences based on multiple, 
supporting knowledge sources reflecting "real-world" knowledge play a crucial role. In 
order for a problem to be solved, it must first be adequately understood. Through 
processes of augmentation and organization, background knowledge is used to interpret a 
new problem in a manner consistent with previously experienced problems. The necessity 
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of such inferentiJ i.ctivity has long been appreciated in the psychological literature. Paige 
and Simon (1966), using protocol analysis to investigate problem solving behavior with 
story problems involving a single unknown, report that "substantive information" (e.g., 
the monetary value of various coins is positive-valued and fixed for coin type) is used by 
some subjects in recognizing impossible story problems. Previous computational models 
(e.g., Bobrow's STUDENT, 1964) viewed such problem solving as a primarily syntactic 
process of translation and did not predict such behavior. More recent psychological inves-
tigation suggests that such inferential activities are important but rely on an effectively 
usable conceptual vocabulary which many subjects do not possess. Mayer et al. (1984), 
analyzing errors in story recall by college students, found that relational elements in the 
problem statement were most difficult to correctly recall, and that difficulty with such 
elements resulted in poor problem solving performance. In addition, recall error rates are 
higher for story propositions irrelevant to the underlying problem type, suggesting that 
knowledge of problem type is used in organizing aspects of a problem statement during 
understanding. Evidence from Marsh.ii (1984) shows that roughly one-half of the errors 
that sixth grade students make on simple word problem are attributable to a lack of 
problem understanding. These findings suggest that supporting knowledge sources play 
an important role in representing a problem for solution beyond the obvious application 
of problem schemata (discussed shortly), and that the integrity of such knowledge sources 
is problematic even for relatively sophisticated subjects. Hence, we are proposing both ... 
that such supporting knowledge sources are used in augmenting a problem representation 
for solution, and that some aspects of these knowledge sources must be learned if effective 
problem solving is to be achieved. 
With respect to processes which transform a target (currently unsolved) problem 
representation into a source (previously solved) problem representation, a number of psy-
chological studies are of interest. Starting with Dreistadt's (1969) suggestive finding that 
figural analogies facilitate creative problem solving performance, a variety of researchers 
have studied the role of transfer between analogous problems. Unfortunately, very little 
of this work has been done within the task domain of algebra story problems. Studies of 
relatively unusual problems (e.g., missionaries and cannibals by Reed, Ernst and Banerji, 
197 4 and a "convergence" problem by Gick and Holyoak, 1980) suggest that naive subjects 
have considerable difficulty in transferring problem solving strategies between isomorphic 
versions of these problems. At first glance, such findings might seem to contradict our 
assertion that analogical reasoning plays a crucial role in learning to solve algebra story 
problems. However, subsequent experimentation by Gick and Holyoak (1983) aimed at 
facilitating analogical transfer between related problems supports the importance of learn-
ing a generalized "problem schema" in developing problem solving competence. According 
to Holyoak (1984), such schemata are learned by "eliminative induction" (comparable to 
"learning from examples" in the computational literature), a process which is indispensable 
in developing the ability to recognize and apply generalized solution strategies for skilled 
problem solvers. These schematic strategies are used to reorganize and interpret the 
problem statement with an eye towards achieving a solution as quickly as possible (termed 
"solution-focusing by Holyoak). 
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The studies ~f tr~er between analogously related problems mentioned thus far have 
been conducted with relatively naive subjects, perhaps accounting for the apparent paucity 
of analogical reasoning processes contributing to problem solving. According to Gentner 
(1983), such a deficit could be accounted for by an "analogical shift conjecture" suggesting 
that novice reasoners draw primarily from literally similar problem solving experiences 
in solving new problems, since their repertoire of potential problem analogs is limited. 
With increasing experience, however, their use of analogical reasoning should increase. 
Clement (1981, 1982), working with skilled problem solvers, reports findings which may 
corroborate this hypotheses. Describing the results of protocol analysis when experts are 
presented with challenging physics problems, Clement reports that subjects use chains of 
interconnected analogies during problem solving, both on the basis of recalling previously 
experienced problems and by directly generating analogs by altering components of the 
original problem which are particularily difficult. A process model of subjects' problem 
solving behavior is described which involves elaborative and evaluative processes quite 
similar to those proposed here, although issues of recognition and consolidation are not 
addressed. What is particularily interesting about Clement's work is the manner in which 
he fits processes of analogical reasoning with a general problem solving context. Analogies 
are drawn not only in an attempt to identify likely solution strategies, but also in an effort 
to understand an existing analogy. 
As a final example of psychological investigation aimed at understanding the role of_ 
analogies in learning problem solving skills for novel problems, Gentner and Gentner (1983) 
describe a study in which groups of naive subjects were given instruction iri electrical 
circuitry problems on the basis of two underlying metaphors. One group of subjects 
received a "ft.owing waters" metaphor in which aspects of circuit problems (i.e., current 
and resist·ance) were likened to fluid ft.ow in a closed system (e.g., a battery is like a 
partially filled water reservoir). A second group of subjects received a "teeming· crowds" 
metaphor involving crowds of mice running through corridors. According to the authors, 
subjects receiving the aqueous metaphor should have been better able to reason about 
battery problems than their counterparts receiving the crowd metaphor, who should have 
excelled on resistance problems. Unfortunately, the empirical results of problem solving 
performance are not clearly in favor of these expectations, particularity for more difficult 
circuit problems. However, this study can. be criticized for confounding problem solving 
performance with subjects' background knowledge of both source (i.e., ft.uid flow) and 
target (i.e., circuitry) domains-as well as presenting problems which may well have exceeded 
the abilities of their subjects. It would be interesting to repeat this sort of experimentation 
with genuinely naive subjects and more accessible problems. 
The two ,final process components described in our proposed model, processes which 
assert useful constraining equations and processes which decompose a complex prob-
lem into related subproblems, have received rich empirical support in the psychological 
literature on solving algebra word and story problems. Hinsley et al. (1977) give clear 
evidence for the importance of problem schemata reflecting problem type and associated 
solution methods in a series of experiments designed to demonstrate the existence and 
use of these schema. These studies reveal that subjects can reliably (across subjects) 
identify problem types, that such categorization of problems occurs early in understanding 
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the problem (after· approximately 18% of the problem has been read), that subjects can 
accurately predict what sorta of information will come later in the problem before reading 
further, and that subjects can state problem solving strategies which will prove effective 
even before reading the entire problem. Thus problem schemata containing useful problem 
solving methods appear to exist and to be used by experienced subjects in understanding 
and then solving new algebra story problems. In fact, these authors report further 
experiments suggesting that subjects attempt to apply problem schemata even in the 
absence of contextual cues (subjects were presented with semantically nonsensical cover 
stories), and that irrelevant contextual cues placed within the problem text can cause some 
subjects to incorrectly categorize problems, resulting in misinterpretation consistent with 
an inappropriately applied schema. 
Also interested in the acquisition and use of problem schemata, Mayer et al. (1984) 
report on a variety of experiments based on errors evident during cued recall of algebra 
story problems. Frequency of occurrence of particular algebra stories in a large sample 
of textbooks (1097 problems were collected) correlates positively with accuracy of cued 
story recall, suggesting that problem types most commonly encountered during subject's 
educational experiences are precisely the types most likely to be learned as problem 
schemata and later applied when understanding a new problem. As further evidence 
for the acquisition of problem schemata, conversion errors (mistakenly categorizing one 
problem type as· another) favor higher frequency problem types from the textbook sample ... 
Hence, in addition to providing evidence for augmentation and organization processes in 
representing algebra story problems for solution (discussed earlier), these authors provide 
plausible evidence for the acquisition and use of problem schemata. 
In summary, our focus on learned problem schemata as a major contributor in the 
acquisition of problem solving skill for algebra story problems is consistent with existing 
psychological evidence. In addition, some empirical results (e.g., Mayer et al., 1984) 
are suggestive of the importance of acquiring the ability to effectively apply supporting 
knowledge sources in the organization of a new problem representation. Each of the five 
process components discussed in our proposed model appears consistent with some aspects 
of the empirical literature concerning the acquisition and use of problem solving skills in 
algebra story problems and related task domains. However, as suggested previously, none of 
these empirical findings are conclusive with respect to knowledge structures and processes 
involved in acquiring problem solving skill. It is our hope that by the judicious construction 
of computational models of learning and teaching problem solving skill, we may be able 
to better understand at a more specific level the sorts of structures and processes which 
support effective problem solving. 
Experimentation 
Descriptive studies (e.g., Kilpatrick, 1967; Clement, 1981, 1982; and Larkin, 1983) of 
problem solving activities in complicated task domains appear to be the norm. We plan to 
make use of existing datasets (e.g., Kilpatrick, 1967 reports collecting extensive "thinking-
aloud" protocols for subjects engaged in solving algebra story problems) as possible, re-
analyzing protocols in terms of the process components described in this proposal. As 
necessary, we have ample access to elementary, secondary, and post-secondary school 
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students as subj~ts -in descriptive or experimental studies. Of particular interest to us is 
investigation of the facility with which subjects of varying skill levels recognize, elaborate 
and evaluate analogies when solving algebra story problems. A clearer empirical picture 
of this problem solving strategy should have important implications for computational 
approaches to learning and teaching problem solving skills in this and other domains. 
Prescriptive experimental studies are more difficult to conduct, but potentially more 
revealing. Such studies in the domain of problem solving typically involve manipulation 
of task materials and stimulus setting as independent variables, and various measures of 
problem solving performance as dependent variables. Methodological problems in past 
studies of problem solving behavior have been selection of task difficulty (e.g., Reed, Ernst 
and Banerji, 1974) and control of subject's background knowledge (e.g., Gentner and 
Gentner, 1983). Algebra story problems in some measure resolve the former difficulty, since 
most subjects can be assumed to possess sufficient background knowledge for understanding 
the story line typical of such problems. A focus on learning with naive subjects (e.g., 
selecting subjects before they have been exposed to ASP's or doing stratified random 
sampling with college students) may relieve the latter problem with respect to specific 
quantitative knowledge. 
Again, our interest in the acquisition of conceptual and strategic knowledge which f acil-
itates problem solving in this domain is of primary importance. We are hypothesizing that 
analogical reasoning plays an important role in learning and teaching of specific problem .. 
solving skills. Empirical verification of this hypothesis must illuminate processing issues 
of recognition, elaboration, evaluation and consolidation which. compose the constituent 
activities in transforming a novel problem into another, better understood, problem. At 
present, we expect to conduct relatively simple experiments in which subjects are presented 
with a choice of analogical sources of varying appropriateness in solving a novel problem by 
virtue of having solved each of these sources in the immediate past. Choice of analogical 
source and performance in subsequent problem solving should be revealing with respect to 
subprocesses composing the analogical transformation of a novel algebra story problem. 
III. Teaching with multiple knowledge sources 
Now that we have presented our performance and learning models, and given support 
for their validity, we can tum to the description of the teaching system that will use these 
models as a foundation. Our performance model will provide the explicit statement of 
the expertise to be conveyed. Since the necessity of such an explicit model has long been 
recognized and since the model has been described in details, we will not say much about 
it in this section. What is novel and will be emphasized is the use of an explicit learning 
model to guide the way in which the expertise is conveyed. 
A perspective on teaching 
To our knowledge, no currently implemented teaching system deals explicitly with the 
multiple sources of knowledge that students bring to bear while learning. The "overlay" 
student modelling paradigm (Carr and Goldstein, 1977) used in many systems, rules and 
malrules (Sleeman, 1983) and the subskill lattice proposed for_ Debuggy (Burton, 1982) all 
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concentrate on rela"tively independent skills in some isolated domain. The "genetic graph" 
(Goldstein, 1982) does include explicit links between pieces of knowledge, but these links 
are static and do not cut across domains. 
Some recent theoretical studies attempt to dynamically relate the acquisition of new 
knowledge to previous knowledge in the same or in another domain. For example, Matz 
(1982) studies the transition from arithmetic skills to high-school algebra. To a certain 
extent, the repair theory (Brown and VanLehn, 1980) and its successor, the step theory 
(VanLehn, J983) also accounts for processes that take place when old or incomplete 
knowledge is faced with new situations, although from the restricted perspective of surface 
repairs. Most importantly, these theories are oriented toward explaining the emergence of 
errorful behavior, and do not claim to be general learning theories. Furthermore, no effort 
has been invested so far to fully evaluate their implications for teaching. 
Furthering these recent efforts, we take the position that the student's learning is 
greatly affected by his previous knowledge, and that teaching must necessarily be per-
formed in this context if it is to successfully foster the integration of new information. 
Although we will certainly draw on the findings of the aforementioned theories, our own 
learning system will provide the main theoretical basis for our teaching approach, since it 
is based on the same views. A similar methodology is being applied by Anderson and his .. 
colleagues at CMU who are building intelligent tutors on the basis of their theory of skill 
acquisition (Anderson, 1984). 
Our domain is particularly well suited for an investigation of teaching with multiple 
knowledge sources for many of the same reasons as it is for learning. In addition, the ease 
of task generation for specific problem schemata, and the interactive guidance needed for 
problem solving provide an ideal framework to study the kind of "connected" teaching 
that we advocate. Because we have access to previous research on the knowledge sources 
involved in solving story problems, and because these sources are of limited scope and can 
be well defined, we expect to be able to: 
• model the student's knowledge and follow the skill acquisition process in terms of the 
interactions between knowledge sources 
• take advantage of the interactions between knowledge sources to present new informa-
tion, to guide the student and to form a teaching plan~ 
A generally accepted framework for intelligent teaching systems was presented by 
Hartley and Sleeman (1973). It comprises: an expert module (knowledge of the domain), 
a diagnostic module (student model) and a means-ends teaching module (teaching strate-
gies). Some researchers have also included an explicit representation of a syllabus. We 
will follow this division in our presentation (in a sightly different order). In this project, 
we want to view teaching as a series of transformations on the state of knowledge of the 
student, achieved by an iterative process of diagnostic and tutorial actions. Therefore we 
will emphasize the complementary functions of the diagnostic and the teaching modules. 
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The diagnostic· niodUle 
The diagnostic module is comprised of a data structure, the student model, which is 
executable like most such models in recent teaching systems, and of a diagnostic process 
which updates the student model. We will review them in separate sections for clarity. 
The structure of the student model 
In the student modelling paradigms mentioned above, the knowledge of the student is 
represented as a subset of a representation of the domain skills, in some cases augmented 
to include buggy behaviors. For our student model to effectively refiect the effect of 
multiple knowledge sources, it must be provided with learning capabilities which we expect 
the student to have. We want to explore the feasibility of a new paradigm: a student 
model which is not a subset of an extended syllabus, but an active learning entity by 
itself. A rudimentary form of such a student model has been proposed by Self (1977) in 
his interesting concept teaching experiment. In our case, we claim that these learning 
capabilities can direct the search for a model in a way which is tightly connected to the 
teaching history as well as offer an experimental testbed for the teaching module. 
Because we are independently developing a corresponding learning system, we have a 
computational model of our current learning theory, and we can incorporate within the 
teaching system a version of the learning system to be used as a student model. Being active 
and somewhat independent, this model can be triggered by other modules with specific ... 
parameters to provide useful information. Now having a completely separate problem 
solver for the student may not be desirable. The overlay modelling paradigm has the 
advantage that it avoids duplication of knowledge representation for the expert and the 
student. Not only is such duplication wasteful in terms of memory space, but it ignores the 
natural relations that exist between the two structures. To have the best of both worlds, 
we will establish links between the distinct student model and the expert's. knowledge 
representation. These links will either claim equivalence between some subparts of the 
knowledge, in which case duplication can be avoided by providing access to the expert 
knowledge, or report some difference in which case separate representations are at least 
partially required (e.g. for a naive concept of a motion-event). Although this looks like 
an extended overlay, it is important to understand that these links are not static pointers 
between two knowledge structures, but are a dynamic window through which parts of the 
expert knowledge can be indexed by an active learning model. 
Apart from these_connections to the expert, the main difference between the internal 
student model and the external learner being taught (eventually real students) is that 
the teaching system has direct access to the internal representation of its own student 
model, but only communicates with the external learner through a (formal) language. The 
internal student model also contains some ancilliary information concerning the frontier of 
its current knowledge, its learning history and its preferred learning strategies. 
The paradigm of a transparent student model based on a theory of learning with 
multiple knowledge sources has enormotis potential because it links teaching to learning 
in a very direct way. It is an interesting development of recent ideas by Langley et al. 
(1984a, 1984b) who use machine learning techniques to infer the student's procedure from 
his behavior by trying to learn the procedure that would produce such a behavior. However, 
we go one step furtlier in that we use our learning model to search for the student's state 
of knowledge, taking, like Langley, advantage of the fact that the learning techniques can 
both learn and mislearn. Whereas Langley et al. use learning techniques for the purpose 
of inducing the performance model independently of how it was learned originally, we use 
our learning model as an operator to traverse the space of possible performance models so 
that we can take advantage of the teaching history. We will now describe how we manage 
the enormous search space generated by such a complex operator by placing the search in 
the context of the teaching sequence. 
The diagnostic process 
Since we propose to interleave teaching and diagnostic actions, the management of the 
student model takes place in two phases. First, it must take into account the last teaching 
action, then it must perceive the actual effect of the teaching action on the external learner. 
While a teaching action is being performed, the student model can be made to tentatively 
refiect its expected effect. Since the student model is an active learning model, this can be 
done by running a simulation. Alternatively, a direct modification by the teaching module 
is conceivable. In this sense the first use of the student model is to act locally as a perfect 
student. The diagnostic process can then compare the behavior of the external student to 
that of its internal version and modify the latter to be a model of the external student. 
In this framework, not only is it possible to compare the student's performance to the 
expert's, but also to that of a locally perfect student model. Comparison of the student's -
behavior with the expert's will lead to the formulation of an overall teaching plan, while 
comparison with the perfect student's will generally lead to local teaching decisions. 
In general, tuning the internal model to the external student is an extremely difficult 
task requiring very powerful inference methods (Sleeman, 83). This is especially true in 
a domain like ours where opportunities. for direct observation of the student's. problem 
solving behavior are of necessity relatively rare*. We have suggested (Wenger, 1985) 
that a purely inductive approach to student modelling may be unnecessarily difficult in 
many cases. Even with very powerful inference capabillities, it may never be possible 
to model the student with enough precision given the number of extraneous factors that 
can be relevant. Indeed we suggested that the student modelling process should include 
interactions with the student, and be interwoven with tutorial interventions, whenever 
it is the case that the student can articulate his decisions. · .1terviewing young students 
about their knowledge of simple algebraic manipulations, Sleeman (1984) reports having 
found them to be very articulate in describing their own approaches. This indicates that 
students solving algebra story problems which come later in the curriculum can be expected 
to answer reasonable questions about their problem solving. More recently, Greeno (1984) 
is taking an interactive approach in his algebra tutor where he requires the student to 
* It may be argued that other domains like programming (in recent tutors for Pascal 
(Johnson and Soloway, 1984) or Lisp (Farrel et al., 1984)), provide more opportunities 
for such observations. However, observing the code is more informative only if one just 
teaches a programming language in isolation. A written program is only the end result of 
a long reasoning process. Hone teaches program design, the difficulty is the same as in 
our domain. 
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indicate his undentmding of the structure of a problem as well as his relevant background 
knowledge with a graphical editor. Although his main purpose is to enforce a deeper 
and clearer perception of the relations underlying the problem statement, the information 
provided by the student has great diagnostic value. 
Therefore we will provide mechanisms to interactively confirm or refine hypotheses 
about the student's knowledge in addition to (not in replacement of) inductive capabilities. 
To this end we plan to allow the diagnostic process to generate a limited number of 
questions which can be inserted into the teaching dialogue in concert with the teaching 
module. We envision the two modules cooperating to conduct a dialogue with the student, 
probing his knowledge while providing guidance for problem solving (see next section). 
The use of such interactions simplifies the diagnostic process in two ways. First the search 
can concentrate on specific parts of the model in the context of the tutorial dialogue. 
Secondly the confirmation of the student model can be partial since further refinements 
may be provided by later questions when required. 
We have argued that even with good interactive facilities, the student modelling process 
will have to apply induction to some extent (Wenger, 1985). There are facts about our 
diagnost.ic process which make the search somewhat easier independently of our interactive 
facilities. First, while it is true that both the Debuggy system (Burton, 1982) and LMS 
(Sleeman, 1983) had to deal with combinatorial explosion during the diagnostic search even 
for very simple· domains, it should be noted that the search was really taking place out .. 
of any learning context. Because our model incrementally takes into account the teaching 
sequence and the interactions between knowledge sources influencing learning (e.g. wrong 
transfers in analogies) and problem solving (e.g. wrong cuing for a problem) we expect 
to be able to guide the search in a sensible way. Indeed, when the student model is first 
modified to reflect a teaching actions, points that are prone to mislearning are already 
:flagged as such and can be considered first, should the student manifest difficulties. Such 
dynamic priming of potential errors is impossible without a learning model. 
Secondly, we plan to conduct a detailed analysis of likely sources of errors associated 
with individual knowledge sources. This effort will be greatly facilitated by large collections 
of data provided by other studies, in particular (Marshall, 1984). A priori knowledge of 
likely error sources is essential for the search involved in the modelling task to be efficient. 
So far the sources of errors we have identified fall into four general classes for a given piece 
of background knowledge: 
• it may be missing; 
• the opportunity to use it may be overlooked; 
• it may be incorrect or incomplete; 
• it may be misapplied. 
For the equation applicable to the triangle problem that we have been considering, 
these classes of errors could manifest in the following ways for a student: 
• he does not know the equation hyp2 = legl 2 + leg22; 
• he does not notice that the legs of the triangle are perpendicular; 
• his equation reads hyp2 = leg1 2 x leg22; 
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• he applies tlim· equation to a problem where the two legs are not perpendicular. 
It is interesting to note that, with the exception of mere slips of performance, all the 
errors we have observed up to now can be traced to one of these classes of errors for 
one or more knowledge sources. This is made possible because we view the process of 
understanding the problem, that is, moving from the given problem representation to the 
equations, as a series of incremental contributions by different knowledge sources. Apart 
from its value as a problem solving and learning model, this view has profound implications 
for the kind of remedial actions which can be taken by the teaching module, correcting 
errors at the knowledge source level rather than at the problem level. We feel that this is 
a very promising direction. 
The teaching module 
At the outset of the project, we will not be concerned with the questions of the output 
format in which the information should be presented to the student, although these are 
important issues. Working with a formal language will free us from the problems of natural 
language processing or graphic generation. Rather we will deal with the basic issue of 
determining which pieces of information are relevant at a given time and in which context 
they can be related to other pieces of know ledge. 
As mentioned in the preceding section, much of the tutoring will be done by means of-
a dialogue conducted by a cooperation of the diagnostic module and the teaching module. 
In the first stage, this dialogue will take place in the formal language mentioned above 
(which can later be translated into a subset of English for human students). Although 
the state of the art in language processing does not support free dialogues, research in 
teaching systems has been met with a fair amount of success in interactive dialogues 
with students in limited domains (see Sophie's dialogue facilities (Burton and Brown, 
1977) and Ace, a program that analyzes students' explanations of their reasoning (Sleeman 
and Hendley, 1982)). The question-answer approach to guidance for problem solving has 
been successfully adopted by a group at UCl's Educational Technology Center (Bork, 
1981) (Trowbridge and Chiocarello, 1985) in their highly regarded CAI projects for physics 
problems, and we will benefit from their experience. 
With the information provided by the performance and the learning models as well 
as the information it receives from the diagnostic module, the teaching module will fulfill 
four functions: 
• establish a teaching plan; 
• present general knowledge that the student needs or which is on the plan; 
• generate new problems on the basis of the teaching plan, the current student model 
and the problem templates in its curriculum; 
• supervise the process of solving one problem by the kind of interactive guidance 
described above. This function will build on some extensive research on coaching 
strategies done by Brown and Burton (1982), Goldstein and Carr (1977), and recently 
by Farrell et al. ( 1984). . 
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In selecting ·tutorial actions, the teaching module will follow principles that parallel 
those guiding the learning system, i.e. it will generate a teaching sequence which presents 
information to the learner 
• in an incremental way: only moderate changes of the student's model are required; 
• in a connected way: the new material relates to correct knowledge that the student 
possesses, and in many cases the connectedness is explicitly used in the teaching 
process; 
• in a reactive way: the student will be required to use his new knowledge on subsequent 
problems. 
One interesting us~ of the active student model is in experimenting with teaching 
decisions on the student model before really acting on them with the external learner. 
O'Shea (1979) perceived that the fact that his student model was too primitive for that 
kind of dynamic experimentations was a severe limitation of his self-improving teaching 
system. It will be very useful to &d out how much such experimentation on the part of 
the system improves the teaching performa.Iice. If the improvement is substantial, it could 
be hypothesized that the teacher's ability to momentarily become a virtual student and 
receive his or her own teaching from a student's point of view is a critical teaching skill. 
Scope, syllabus and expertise 
Expertise in solving story problems, like most forms of expertise, covers a range of 
abilities from generally applicable weak methods to highly specific knowledge. Without 
general strategies and understanding, the expertise is limited to a small set of well-
structured problems, but fails in all other cases, even when a familiar problem is presented 
in an unusual way. Without highly specialized knowledge, the novice does not have a 
good framework to organize the problem in a way that is readily amenable to a solution 
(Larkin, 1983). Obviously, there is a continuum of subskills between the two extremes. 
Our knowledge-based approach to learning and teaching has the uncommon advantage of 
covering the entire spectrum in a unified fashion which accounts for this continuum. Recall 
that we view the process of understanding a particular problem as an incremental struc-
turing of the problem representation by knowledge sources implemented as independent 
agents. These knowledge sources include both very specific knowledge, like schemata for 
different problem types, and general background knowledge, like time, space, etc.· 
The skills at the domain-specific end of the spectrum are performance-oriented and are 
strongly connected to-the acquisition of problem schemata, of well-tuned conceptualizations 
and of matching skills to retrieve relevant templates early in the solving process. These 
skills can be fostered by judicious teaching plans taking into account the underlying 
connections between example problems and by appropriate hints from the teacher. 
The weak methods include problem-solving strategies and the ability to understand the 
situation described by the problem. For the purpose of this project, we want to measure 
this latter ability by the quality of the problem representation that the student builds 
before the problem is related to previously encountered problem types. In the context of 
analogical reasoning, we define this as the amount of structural information that is used 
in drawing analogies. We claim that this deeper understanding of the problem hinges on 
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correct application-of background knowledge to structuring and augmenting the problem 
description. Because our diagnostic and remedial actions are precisely oriented toward 
background knowledge and its applicability, they will help the student develop the ability 
to deal with new problems. To enforce problem understanding, the teaching module can 
introduce in the given statement some pieces of information whose relevance can only be 
determined after a relatively complete structured representation of the problem has been 
reached. 
The interaction between the two systems 
Although some work with simulated students has been done (Goldstein, 1982) (Self, 
1977), our situation is unique in the sense that our learning system is not merely developed 
as a testbed for a particular teaching system, but as a machine learning project in its own 
right. By working on both a teaching and a learning system simultaneously we will benefit 
from a shared exploration of underlying representations and processes. In addition, the 
interactions taking place in the course of these two parallel investigations will refiect the 
natural interdependence of theories of learning and teaching. The nature and implications 
of this interdependence is a major theoretic issue central to our research on teaching. 
Furthermore, if care is taken to parameterize the characteristics of both systems, we 
can link them to explore their respective. features by holding one fixed and varying the 
other. Although there can be doubts concerning the general validity of such "closed loop" .. 
testbeds, it should be stressed again that it is not either system's primary purpose and 
that these experiments will be only used as preliminary tests. 
Such closed loop experiments in the first testing stage offer a number of advantages. 
Different levels of teacher intervention and problem generation can be precisely defined to 
evaluate different learning algorithms. Different teaching plans can be evaluated by the 
correctness and completeness of the know ledge structures acquired by the learning system. 
This ability to "see" the knowledge structures and processes of the student provides us 
with a first evaluation of the teaching system, without having to deal with the problem 
of abstracting the actual solution process from indirect evidence such as verbal protocols. 
However we do intend to test the teaching system with human students. 
IV. Conclusions 
Taking into account the effect of multiple knowledge sources is a timely step in the 
current research lines of both machine learning and ITS. The majority of computational ap-
proaches to learning reported thus far have investigated isolated task domains in which the 
learner is implicitly provided with an attentional focus on important aspects of the learning 
task. In contrast, learning to solve algebra story problems provides a rich, relatively open-
ended task environment in which inferences must be drawn from a variety of diverse sources 
of knowledge. Likewise, compared with traditional research in ITS, our task domain 
provides a challenging medium for investigating issues of curriculum planning, student 
modelling and instruction. The central role played by analogical reasoning in bringing 
multiple knowledge sources to bare in understanding and solving algebra story problems 
presents novel opportunities for investigation of learning and teaching alike. Many of 
these opportunities stem from our interest in making learning and teaching "connected" to 
previous knowledge. Hence our choice of an application domain midway between common-
sense reasoning and formal problem-solving allows us to attack challenging problems 
without having to encode an unreasonably large amount of background knowledge. By 
combining parallel but independently developed learning and teaching systems into a single 
experimental setting we are recognizing the duality of theories of learning and teaching in 
a synergistic fashion. Our system's potential as a testbed for theoretical issues will make 
it an important contribution for both fields. 
Taking a more specific viewpoint, the proposed research is novel in several important 
ways. First, we are interested in computational models of what we term "conceptual 
evolution," a form of concept acquisition guided by utility in problem solving performance 
rather than a priori criteria of conceptual correctness. Hence we are proposing a form 
of learning which is inherently errorful but remarkably robust with respect to a changing 
external environment. In our view, this form of conceptual adaptation appears much more 
consonant with human performance and should allow a wide space of potential performance 
levels for our computational problem solver. 
Second, the relatively unrestricted use of analogical reasoning during transformational 
processes of problem understanding represents an investigation of analogical processes in 
problem solving which anticipates an apparent trend in computational studies of analogy. 
Rather than viewing analogy as a special or uncommon process invoked occassionally when .. 
more routine problem solving strategies have been exhausted, we argue that viewing one 
problem situation as if it were another, more familiar problem situation is an ubiquitous 
component of effective problem solving. In our view, new problem situations must be 
understood in a connected fashion with existing knowledge sources if problem solving is 
to be possible. Analogical reasoning provides this sort of connected understanding. 
Third, the open-ended nature of expertise in algebra story problems offers a new 
challenge for a teaching system. Our view of problem understanding as the successive ap-
plication of background knowledge sources to the current problem provides a performance 
model which focuses diagnostic and tutorial actions on the concepts and misconceptions 
underlying the problem solving activity. While this view lifts the teaching beyond the 
solution of specific problems, we still recognize the pedagogical importance of dealing with 
the schemata that people do develop and associate with different problem types. Thus our 
approach to teaching addresses a wide range of problem solving skills essential for expertise 
in this domain. 
Fourth, we propose that the diagnostic and teaching processes be woven into one 
interactive process consisting of alternating diagnostic and tutorial actions. This requires 
that both processes cooperate to generate a coherent dialogue, but it allows student 
modelling to be incremental, and tightly connected to instructional units. Furthermore we 
suggest that the derivation of the student model be a combination of inductive inferences 
based on observation of the student's actions and direct interactions with the student. 
Finally, the central role played by the learning model in the teaching functions makes 
an explicit use of the interdependence of teaching and learning. This interdependence is 
manifest both in the diagnostic function where the learning model is used to connect the 
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diagnostic proce&!I .to the teaching history and in the formation of teaching actions where 
it provides guidance by helping predict the effects that can be expected from these actions. 
We plan to study the nature and implications of this interdependence in the context of 
teaching systema, cJaiming that it is one of the most important issues identified by more 
than a decade of research in ITS. 
.. 
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